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Abstract  10 
The world’s largest concentration of cold-water coral (CWC) is found off the Norwegian coast. Most 11 
CWC discoveries are recent, posing new challenges for Norwegian coastal and fisheries authorities 12 
regarding the management of deep-sea resources. Scientific knowledge of CWC is limited, and many 13 
citizens have not even heard about them. This creates problems for the application of stated 14 
preference methods to capture their economic value, and very few such studies have been 15 
conducted. To fill this gap, we designed a discrete choice experiment, which was implemented in a 16 
valuation workshop setting in order to derive estimates of participants’ willingness to pay (WTP) for 17 
increasing the protection of CWC. Despite the fact that marine industries such as oil/gas and fisheries 18 
could be adversely affected by CWC protection, this did not reduce the respondents’ willingness to 19 
pay for further protection. The possibility that CWC play an important role as habitat for fish was the 20 
single most important variable to explain respondents WTP for CWC protection. The survey revealed 21 
a high degree of preference heterogeneity, whilst we found an average WTP for CWC protection in 22 
the range of EUR 274-287. 23 
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1 Introduction 38 
Marine organisms have long fascinated humans, as well as being of crucial importance for our well-39 
being. Marine ecosystems provide supporting, provisioning, regulating and cultural ecosystem 40 
services as defined in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005). Over recent decades, 41 
increasing awareness of the benefits our oceans provide has raised an interest in assessing the 42 
economic value of these goods and services, although due to their “hidden” nature, many of these 43 
benefits go un-noticed until they diminish (Stewart and Smout, 2013). Notwithstanding this, a 44 
number of studies have recently emerged which quantify the economic benefits of protecting marine 45 
species (Jobstvogt et al., 2014; Rogers, 2013; Hynes et al., 2013; Ressurreicao et al., 2011). 46 
 47 
Tropical corals have been subject to a series of economic valuation studies (see e.g. Spurgeon, 1992, 48 
Pendleton, 1995, Parsons and Thur, 2007, Sarkis et al., 2012), and have been identified as the global 49 
biome with the highest valued ecosystem services in aggregate (de Groot et al., 2012). Their deep- 50 
sea cousins, cold-water corals (CWC) have by contrast so far been subject to only one valuation 51 
effort, which was largely inconclusive (Glenn et al., 2010). Moreover, there are many more gaps in 52 
scientific knowledge of deep-sea ecosystems than for most terrestrial and coastal ecosystems 53 
(Ramirez-Llodra et al., 2011). Indeed, until quite recently our scientific knowledge about CWC and 54 
their functions in the deep-sea was very limited. The lack of scientific knowledge of CWC is reflected 55 
in the lower degree of public awareness of this resource, and less political pressure to conserve CWC 56 
compared to tropical corals. Nonetheless, during the last ten years, a substantial number of CWC 57 
protected areas have been established worldwide (Armstrong et al., 2014). 58 
 59 
Although there are indications that CWC may provide habitat for some fish species (Stone 2006, 60 
Edinger et al., 2007), our knowledge about how CWC ecosystems function is far from complete. 61 
These knowledge gaps clearly complicate economic valuation of CWCs, as illustrated by the discrete 62 
choice experiment (DCE) study conducted by Glenn et al. (2010). Participants showed a low level of 63 
knowledge of CWC, which may partly explain the lack of statistical significance of the price attribute. 64 
Due to this statistically insignificant cost parameter, the authors stop short of estimating WTP for the 65 
attributes. In general, the participants in the Glenn et al. (2010) survey had a positive attitude 66 
towards protecting CWC areas, and preferred protecting all known and potential CWC areas as 67 
opposed to protecting only the known CWC areas. Further, the results showed that whereas the 68 
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participants wanted to ban all trawling in CWC areas, they did in general not want to ban all fishing 69 
activities in these areas. Trawling is a particularly damaging form of fishing for CWC.  70 
 71 
In a related study, Jobstvogt et al. (2014) value both non-use and use values attached to deep-sea 72 
environments around the coast of Scotland.  They do not explicitly focus on CWC, although these 73 
habitats are found within their study area. The authors describe this deep-sea environment by 74 
attributes comprising the potential for organisms to contribute to the development of new 75 
medicines, and biodiversity expressed as number of marine species, which are protected. The 76 
authors argue that preferences for conserving such species represent non-use values1. They show 77 
that there is a positive WTP on the part of Scottish residents for both attributes, and that WTP for the 78 
“best” protection option is in the range of £ 70 – 77 per household per year.  79 
 80 
We carried out our study in Norway, which has one of the highest densities of CWC in the world (IMR 81 
2012). The exploration of the sea-bed off the Norwegian coast, partly by oil companies and partly by 82 
research institutions, has uncovered many CWC occurrences and reefs. According to the most recent 83 
assessments, 1100 CWC occurrences have been identified within the Norwegian exclusive economic 84 
zone (IMR 2012). These marine surveys have also shown that many CWC reefs are being adversely 85 
affected by human activities; at an early stage of the exploration, scientists estimated that 30-50% of 86 
the known CWC reefs had been damaged or impacted (Fosså et al., 2002). Threats to CWC include 87 
deep sea trawling, oil and gas exploration, mining and aquaculture. Today, as more CWC reefs have 88 
been discovered, the percentage of CWC sites found to be impacted may be lower, since CWC sites 89 
are now legally protected from bottom trawling as soon as they are identified. However, it is a fact 90 
that CWC have been, and still are being adversely impacted by commercial sea-bed operations, of 91 
which bottom trawling is the main culprit. Hence, improvements to the management of the 92 
ecosystem services provided by such biogenic habitats are of vital importance. At the same time, it is 93 
also necessary to present the social costs of further protection, which for the moment are potential 94 
losses in value added for the oil industry and the fisheries.   95 
 96 
                                                     
1
  This attribute is described in the survey as follows: “Animals such as deep-sea fish, starfish, corals, worms, 
lobsters, sponges, and anemones would benefit most from the protection.“ 
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This paper reports the results of a stated preferences (SP) study valuing protection of CWC off the 97 
Norwegian coast in order to better include these types of resources in ocean management. The 98 
objective of the study is twofold: (i) to derive people´s WTP for protection of CWC reefs in Norway, 99 
and (ii) to analyze what determines people’s WTP for CWC protection. We conducted a discrete 100 
choice experiment (DCE) in a valuation workshop setting. A valuation workshop is a meeting of 101 
sampled participants, who complete choice tasks individually whilst learning about the good to be 102 
valued (MacMillan et al, 2006). This setting was chosen to reduce the challenges posed by the 103 
unfamiliarity of the good to be valued. Applying the Total Economic value (TEV) framework we 104 
identified indirect use values of CWC connected to their role as providing a habitat for fish (and other 105 
marine organisms); and non-use values connected to the role CWC play for biodiversity and as an 106 
organism, which people might value for its own sake as two components of TEV. However, we cannot 107 
neatly disentangle the values people hold for CWC due to their role as habitat and the value related 108 
to their mere existence. In section 2 we present the attributes of the DCE, and give an introduction to 109 
the methods used and the dataset. Section 3 presents the results, section 4 discusses the results and 110 
section 5 concludes.  111 
 112 
2 Methods and data 113 
2.1 Methods 114 
CWC is a good unfamiliar to most people. In order to overcome problems connected to the fact that 115 
people are not well informed about the good they are about to value,  it was decided to use the 116 
valuation workshop method of stated preference data collection, instead of postal, internet or face-117 
to-face interviews.2 A valuation workshop departs from interviews and postal/web surveys by more 118 
extensive provision of information about the good to be valued in a group setting,  repeated 119 
valuation procedures and time to think and deliberate between the valuation tasks (Macmillan et al., 120 
2002; MacMillan et al., 2006; Colombo et al., 2013). Valuation workshops are usually performed 121 
within a geographically concentrated area. As our study covers the whole country (Norway) and in 122 
order to be manageable, each respondent was only asked to state their values on one occasion 123 
(although this included the completion of multiple choice sets). The main difference between 124 
                                                     
2
 See e.g. Macmillan et al. (2002) and Christie et al. (2006) for problems connected to stated preference studies 
of unfamiliar goods conducted using face-to-face interviews or mail shots. Valuation workshops are also 
sometimes called the market stall method (Macmillan et al., 2002).   
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valuation workshops and face-to face interviews, postal or internet web survey is the enhanced 125 
provision of information and people’s opportunity to ask questions about unfamiliar goods. In our 126 
study each workshop involved the following steps: 1) a 30-minute power point presentation 127 
concerning CWC, where the participants could ask clarifying questions regarding CWC or the survey, 128 
2) participants individually completed the questionnaire. Each workshop lasted about 2 hours.  129 
 130 
In the selection of the choice attributes we used results from existing literature and expert 131 
interviews. Foley et al (2010) showed that identified ecosystem services connected to CWC are i) as 132 
raw material and ornamental resources (direct use and option values), ii) habitat functions, including 133 
refuge and nursery functions (indirect use values), and iii) non-use values. In the only previous SP 134 
survey which has been implemented on CWC (Glenn et al 2010), the effects of CWC-protection on 135 
off-shore industrial activities was included. As there is substantial off-shore industrial activity in the 136 
form of oil and gas exploitation and fisheries taking place along the Norwegian coast, we found that 137 
including this aspect in our survey was timely. Based on this, it was decided to initially include “size of 138 
protected area” to represent non-use values of CWC, and “habitat for fish” to represent indirect use 139 
values, and “raw material in medicinal products” to represent direct use values or option values, as 140 
this use is negligible as of today. Assuming that protection would imply a total ban of all industrial 141 
activities in the protected area, we used the attribute “attractive for industrial activities” to 142 
represent the societal costs of CWC protection.   143 
          144 
Prior to the final design of the survey we implemented 3 focus groups with experts and 2 focus 145 
groups with “the general public”, each consisting of 5-10 participants to get feedback on the 146 
selection of attributes. Whereas none of the groups opposed the choice of attributes, each of the 147 
groups commented on the rather complex choice situation with 5 attributes, some of which taking 148 
more than two levels. Based on this feedback it was decided to reduce the number of attributes, and 149 
their levels.. As the use of CWC as input in medicinal products is the most speculative value 150 
connected to CWC, this attribute was removed. This yielded a design with two attributes 151 
representing the benefits we may attach to CWC and two attributes representing costs to society and 152 
the individual of further CWC protection. Table 1 shows the four attributes and the levels they take.  153 
     154 
(Table 1 about here) 155 
 156 
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At the time of writing, nine CWC areas are legally protected in Norwegian waters, covering a total of 157 
2445 km2. This area is used as the reference level for the attribute Size. In addition to CWC reefs, 158 
these sites also encompass buffer zones around the reefs. The attribute Size refers to the total 159 
protected area, not the additional area protected. It takes two alternative levels; 5000 km2 and 10 160 
000 km2, where the former expresses a realistic estimate of how large areas of  CWC could easily be 161 
protected as of today, and the latter represents an upper limit for CWC area which could realistically 162 
be protected. Note that the size of protected area encompasses both the CWC occurrences and 163 
buffer zones.   164 
 165 
The most important off-shore commercial activities along the Norwegian coast which pose the 166 
largest threats to CWC are commercial fisheries and oil and gas extraction. The area presently 167 
protected includes some locations, which are attractive for oil and gas exploration and for fisheries 168 
activities, and some which are not. The attribute commercial thus distinguishes between whether 169 
areas eligible for future protection are attractive to these commercial activities or not.3  170 
 171 
The CWC sites currently protected may also include some areas which are of considerable 172 
importance as habitat for fish (including both commercially caught species and other species), and 173 
some which are of less importance. The habitat attribute distinguishes between areas being highly 174 
important as a habitat for fish, compared to areas that are of less importance to fish. Finally, whereas 175 
the cost of maintaining the present size of protected CWC area is set to zero in the design, increasing 176 
the area of protection is assumed to imply an additional cost. The cost attribute takes four possible 177 
levels, and varies between NOK (Norwegian kroner) 100 and 1000 per household annually.4 The 178 
payment vehicle we used is a uniform nominal increase in the annual federal tax.  179 
 180 
Our DCE design included 12 choice tasks per respondent. We prepared the choice sets by maximizing 181 
the expected Bayesian d-efficiency of a multinomial logit model (Scarpa and Rose 2008). The design 182 
was updated after the pilot and twice throughout the main study, in order to utilize more precise 183 
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 Although we merged the two industries into one attribute in the choice card, the two industries were given 
individual attribute levels (important/not important area) such that they could easily be separated into two 
dummy variables in the statistical model (see table 1 for the levels for this attribute).  
4
 The nominal exchange rate for Euro against Norwegian kroner is 8.4 (July 2014). 
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information about respondents’ preferences as informative priors. An example of a choice card is 184 
provided in Appendix A.  185 
 186 
Altogether, 402 persons, including two pilot groups, were surveyed. Of these, 5 persons did not 187 
complete any of the choice cards and were thus eliminated from the sample. The remaining 397 188 
respondents provided us with 4683 choice observations. In addition to the choice cards, the 189 
questionnaire also contained  socio-demographic (SD) variables (gender, age, place of residence, 190 
education level, participation in the labor force, occupation, household size and personal and 191 
household income), and questions regarding attitudes towards environmental protection in general.5 192 
 193 
The theoretical foundation for DCE is random utility theory, which assumes that the utility a person 194 
derives from CWC protection depends on observed characteristics and unobserved idiosyncrasies, 195 
represented by a stochastic component (McFadden, 1974). When the survey respondents are 196 
indexed n, the alternative j, and the choice situation t, the utility to individual n of choosing 197 
alternative j in situation t can be expressed by 198 
 njt n njt n njt njtV p e   b X ,  (1) 199 
where the utility expression is separable in price, 𝑝𝑛𝑗𝑡, and other non-price attributes, njtX , and njte  200 
is a stochastic component allowing for other factors than those observed by an econometrician to 201 
affect individuals’ choices. 202 
 203 
Two things in the above specification need to be noted. First of all, 𝜶𝒏 and nb  are individual-specific, 204 
thus allowing for heterogeneous preferences amongst respondents and leading to a mixed logit 205 
model (MXL).6 Assuming that they are the same for all respondents implies homogenous preferences 206 
and leads to the basic multinomial logit model (MNL), which although very restrictive, is typically a 207 
starting point for econometric analysis of DCE data.  208 
 209 
                                                     
5
 The questionnaire is available from the corresponding author upon request. 
6 Is it typically assumed that individual parameters follow a particular distribution (possibly multivariate 
distribution allowing for non-zero correlation of model parameters).  
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Secondly, the stochastic component of the utility function (
njte ) is of unknown, possibly 210 
heteroskedastic variance   2var njt ne s . Identification of the model is typically assured by 211 
normalizing this variance, such that the error term 
6
njt njt
n
e
s

   is identically and independently 212 
extreme value type one distributed (with constant variance   2ar 6v njt  ), leading to the 213 
following specification: 214 
 njt n n njt n n njt njtU p     b X .  (2) 215 
Note that due to the ordinal nature of utility, this specification still represents the same preferences. 216 
The estimates 𝜎𝑛𝛼𝑛 and n n b  do not have direct interpretation anyway, but if interpreted in relation 217 
to each other the scale coefficient ( 6n ns  ) cancels out. 218 
 219 
Finally, given the interest in establishing estimates of WTP for the non-monetary attributes njtX , it is 220 
convenient to introduce the following modification which is equivalent to using money-metric utility 221 
function (aka estimating the parameters in WTP space; Train and Weeks, 2005): 222 
  nnjt n n njt njt njt n n njt n njt njt
n
U p p     

 
      
 
 
b X β X . (3) 223 
Note that under this specification the vector of parameters n n nβ b  is now (1) scale-free and (2) 224 
can be directly interpreted as a vector of implicit prices for the attributes njtX . Also, in MXL models 225 
an additional advantage of this specification is that the econometrician is able to specify a particular 226 
distribution of WTP in the sample (by specifying the distribution of nβ ) rather than the distribution 227 
of the underlying taste parameters ( nb ). These taste parameters are later divided by a (possibly also 228 
random) price coefficient, indirectly leading to often implausible assumptions about the distribution 229 
of WTP in the sample.  230 
 231 
Estimation of the model parameters is through maximum likelihood techniques. An individual will 232 
choose alternative j if , for all njt nktU U k j  , and the probability that alternative j is chosen from 233 
a set of C alternatives is given by 234 
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  
  
  1
|
n njt n njt
C
n nkt n nktk
exp p
P j C
exp p








β X
β X
 . (4) 235 
  236 
In the simple (fixed parameter) multinomial logit (MNL) model the n-subscript of all parameters can 237 
be suppressed so that the estimated parameters are no longer individual specific. In the MXL 238 
specification, since the probability is conditional on the random terms the unconditional probability 239 
is obtained by multiple integration, and there exists no closed form expression of (4). Instead, it can 240 
be simulated by averaging over D draws from the assumed distributions (Revelt and Train, 1998). As 241 
a result, the simulated log-likelihood function becomes: 242 
 
  
  

  



 
1 1 1
1
exp1
log log
exp
i
n njt n njt
n nkt n nkt
TN D
C
n d t
k
p
p
L
D
β
β
X
X
  (5) 243 
Whereas the model above yields estimates for marginal WTPs for the attributes, we are also 244 
interested in the total WTP for the protection alternatives relative to no further protection. This 245 
corresponds to the compensating surplus (variation) of protection, which can be calculated using 246 
Hanemann (1984) and Small et al. (1981) approach with minor modifications for WTP-space models.7  247 
As the size attributes are mutually exclusive, we present the welfare measures associated with two 248 
exemplary cases – the first, denoted ‘small’ protection, and the second denoted ‘large’ protection, 249 
which differ in size (size5 or size10, respectively) and include all the other choice attributes (oil/gas, 250 
fish, habitat).   251 
 252 
2.2 Data 253 
A professional survey firm was employed to recruit the workshop participants. In the recruitment 254 
process the targeted persons were told that the survey was about management of marine resources, 255 
but not that it was about CWC. In addition, they were told that there was a payment of NOK 500 256 
(about EUR 60) for each participant who completed the survey. In order to secure statistical 257 
representativeness with respect to gender and age, each group is representative with respect to 258 
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 Note that since we are discussing a public program of protecting CWCs we are effectively dealing with a one 
alternative situation; CWCs are at their current state vs. implementing a new program, which simplifies 
calculations further.  
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gender and age for their respective municipality. To secure geographic coverage we sampled 259 
municipalities across the whole country. Altogether 24 valuation workshops (including 2 pilots) in 22 260 
municipalities were conducted. Each workshop had between 12 and 23 participants.  261 
 262 
The sample characteristics are given in table 2.  263 
     (Table 2 about here) 264 
 265 
The sample has a somewhat lower female share (46.5%) compared to the national average (49.8 %). 266 
The age distribution of our sample is very close to the national age distribution, but  we have a lower 267 
share in the youngest group (18-25 years) and a slightly higher share in the middle aged group (46-55 268 
years). Based on postal code we calculated the percentage  living in coastal areas (63%) and  in urban 269 
areas (73%). Both are somewhat higher compared to the national average. About 63% of the survey 270 
sample belongs to the labor force, whereas the national share is 73%. Occupationally, the survey 271 
sample is biased. Of those working in the private sector, the sample contains a higher share of those 272 
belonging to the oil/gas industry, fisheries and aquaculture (8%), whereas it is lower for all other 273 
industries, including services. This self-selection into the sample is as expected as the topic for the 274 
survey is marine resources, and therefore may be perceived as more relevant for those employed in 275 
marine industries. The respondents were divided into ten income groups, each of an interval of NOK 276 
100k (EUR 11.9k) and eight household income groups, each of an interval of NOK 200k (EUR 23.8k) 277 
except the first and last group.  The survey has a lower percentage of low income people compared 278 
to the national average. The sample is biased towards more educated people, 57% had more than 12 279 
years in school compared to the national average on 26%. Finally, only about 10% of the survey 280 
participants were members of an environmental NGO.  281 
 282 
As part of the survey all participants were asked to answer a quiz with eight questions. The quiz was 283 
given immediately after the PP-presentation of CWC, and the quiz questions referred to information, 284 
which was given during the presentation. Almost 30% of the participants achieved a full score, 285 
whereas another 28% scored 7 out of 8, and 25% scored 6 out of 8. Hence, only about 20% got 5 or 286 
less of the 8 quiz questions correct. This shows that the PP-presentation was reasonably effective in 287 
informing people about the aspects of CWC relevant for the valuation exercises, compared for 288 
example with respondents in Glenn et al. (2010). 289 
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 290 
3 Results 291 
In the DCE, the status quo was chosen in 25% of the choices, and in the remaining 75 % of the 292 
choices protecting a larger area was chosen. Table 3 shows the estimation results for the MXL model 293 
with correlations, and for comparison, also for the MNL model.  All models are formulated in WTP-294 
space and hence the parameter estimates for all non-price attributes can be directly interpreted as 295 
WTP amounts. In the MXL model we assumed that the marginal WTPs are normally distributed, 296 
whereas the cost attribute is assumed to be log-normally distributed.8  297 
 298 
     (Table 3 about here) 299 
 300 
Table 3 shows that in the MXL model all attributes are significant and so are their associated 301 
standard deviations, which is an indication of respondents’ unobserved preference heterogeneity. 302 
The habitat attribute had the highest WTP. Respondents were willing to pay EUR 166 more for 303 
protection when the protected area was important habitat for fish compared to when it was not. The 304 
estimated WTP for the oil and the fisheries attributes were positive, which means that if the area was 305 
attractive for the fisheries  and/or for the oil industry people were willing to pay EUR 39 and EUR 16 306 
respectively more for its annual protection, compared if it was not important for these off-shore 307 
industries. Finally, regarding the size of the protected area, respondents were willing to pay EUR 53 308 
for extending the protected area from the current 2445 km2 to 5000 km2, and EUR 66 for an 309 
extension from 2445 to 10 000 km2. The MNL model, on the other hand, yields significant WTPs for 310 
only three of the attributes in addition to cost; size (large), fisheries and habitat. The “size” attributes 311 
in this model have far lower marginal WTPs compared to the MXL model, indicating that these were 312 
the attributes which had the highest correlation with other attributes (the results from the MXL  313 
model without correlation were closer to the MNL results for these attributes than to the MXL model 314 
with correlation).  315 
 316 
                                                     
8
 We have made our dataset and codes available at http://uit.no/prosjekter/prosjekt?p_document_id=349718 
and czaj.org  for others to be able to replicate our results.  
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We also estimated an MNL and an MXL model in which the choice attributes are separately 317 
interacted with each of the socio-demographic (SD) variables. This allows us to identify gross (i.e., 318 
without controlling for differences in the SD variables) effects of each of these variables. These 319 
results are included in appendix B.9 Most of the parameters for the interaction variables are not 320 
significant. Among the significant effects we find that unemployed persons and persons in 321 
households with higher total household income were more likely to choose the SQ alternative, 322 
whereas retired persons were more likely to choose further protection. Male respondents and those 323 
with higher personal income were willing to pay more for the fisheries attribute, whereas older 324 
respondents were willing to pay less for the fisheries attribute. People working in the oil industry and 325 
in the public sector and people living at the coast were willing to pay more for the habitat attribute. 326 
There were no statistically significant differences between respondents living in urban areas 327 
compared to rural households.   328 
 329 
Next, we illustrate our results by simulating WTP for two protection scenarios. We call these “small” 330 
and “large”, and arrange it so that they differ only in the size of newly protected CWC, but in both 331 
cases the areas are important for commercial activities (oil/gas and fisheries) and as habitat for fish. 332 
The procedure we used took uncertainty with respect to model parameters into account. The results 333 
present the mean, standard error (approximated with the standard deviation) and 95% confidence 334 
interval (approximated with the 95% inter-quantile range)  of the welfare measures of the two 335 
scenarios described above. The results, based on the MNL model and the MXL model with 336 
correlations are presented in Table 4.  337 
 338 
(Table 4 about here) 339 
 340 
                                                     
9
 Note that, due to the huge amount of parameters the models where the attributes are interacted with the SD 
for work and occupation are the MXL model without correlations. For all other interaction models the MXL 
model with correlations are applied. 
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The WTP for the two protection scenarios resulting from the MNL model is reasonably close to that 341 
for the MXL model. The simulated WTP for a small and a large degree of protection of cold water 342 
corals equals EUR 274 and EUR 287 per household per year respectively.10 343 
 344 
4 Discussion 345 
There may be trade-offs between protecting CWC and the benefits which society derives from other 346 
services provided by the marine environment such as commercial deep-sea fisheries and petroleum. 347 
From a management and policy perspective, it is thus of considerable interest to identify types of 348 
ecosystem service values to which CWC may contribute and their economic significance.  Foley et al. 349 
(2010), applying the TEEB framework (The Economics of Ecosystems and biodiversity; TEEB, 2010),11 350 
identify several ecosystem services (ES) that CWC provide. Whereas we have derived significant 351 
estimates on peoples’ WTP for CWC protection, it is hard to match these values to specific ecosystem 352 
services that this resource provides. The most obvious ecosystem service provided by CWC is a 353 
habitat for fish (and other marine organisms), which is an intermediate or supporting ecosystem 354 
service.  The largest single value for CWC off the coastline of Norway is people’s WTP for protecting 355 
CWC because of this importance as a habitat for fish, perhaps due to preferences related to the 356 
consumption of fish. The single value attached to the attribute habitat is four times higher than the 357 
value attached to the fisheries attribute and two to three times higher than the size attributes. The 358 
habitat attribute may, however, also relate to non-use values for fish.   359 
 360 
This interpretation arises from the fact that the attribute fisheries has a positive sign. This means that 361 
even if protecting CWC will imply reduced fisheries activities, and thus less fish for consumption, 362 
people are still willing to pay for protecting CWC. Hence, people are not only willing to pay for 363 
protecting CWC because then we get more fish to eat; they may also be willing to pay for protecting 364 
CWC because there will be more fish regardless of whether we eat them or not. So, people value 365 
CWC due to its role as habitat for fish not only because fish provides food (and generate income) for 366 
them, but also because they care about the existence of fish. We are not able to disentangle these 367 
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 Note that the WTP for an aggregate scenario is not a simple sum of WTP for separate attributes, since the 
parameters in the MXL model could be correlated. In order to calculate the WTP we applied a two-tier 
simulation procedure described in Czajkowski et al. (2015).  
11
 TEEB in turn applies the TEV (Total Economic Value) to categorize the ecosystem services to be valued.    
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two motives for WTP. The size attributes (small and large) have significant WTP estimates. Although 368 
it could be tempting to let these attributes represent peoples’ valuation of CWC for its pure existence 369 
(non-use) values, this attribute could also represent the fact that a larger protected area means that 370 
there is more habitat for fish and other marine organisms. As such, the size attributes may also 371 
encompass intermediate (indirect) ecosystem service values. Given the relatively high welfare level 372 
of most people in Norway, it is not unlikely that immaterial concerns play a significant role in 373 
peoples’ preferences. One such immaterial concern is to safely assume that CWC will continue to 374 
exist in Norwegian waters, and that it will continue to provide habitat for fish stocks in the future.   375 
 376 
Due to the complexity of the model and number of observations, including the socio-demographic 377 
characteristics as interactions in the model did not provide many significant results. Among those of 378 
interest is the fact that men, younger people and those with higher income tended to have higher 379 
WTP for the fisheries attribute, whereas people living on the coast, working in the oil industry or 380 
working in the public sector had a higher WTP for the habitat attribute. We did not find statistically 381 
significant effects of the rural-urban gradient, which has been shown to be a significant explanatory 382 
variable in other valuation studies (Martin-Lopez et al., 2012). Neither did we find large gender gaps, 383 
such as Funk and Gathmann (2008) found in areas such as health, environmental protection, defence 384 
spending and welfare policy.   385 
 386 
Wilson and Howarth (2002) point to a paradox that, whereas most ecosystem services are public 387 
goods, the methods applied to elicit how people value them are based on responses from individuals 388 
in private settings. In contrast, group settings can encourage people to share their knowledge, which 389 
in turn increases the likelihood of more informed choices than would be the case if the decision were 390 
left to single individuals (Winquist and Larson, 1998, referred to in Wilson and Howarth, 2002, 391 
p.439). This may be especially relevant in cases with unfamiliar (public) goods, such as CWC. Spash 392 
(2002) adds nuances to this viewpoint by showing that additional information mainly contributes to 393 
inform respondents’ preferences rather than changing them.  Group discussion of the trade-offs 394 
which society faces in environmental management decisions can also produce more consensus over 395 
actions, even when preferences are elicited on an individual basis. The fact that previous studies of 396 
CWC protection have ended up inconclusive due to a non-significant cost attribute (Glenn et al., 397 
2010) was a strong signal that the “minimum information” modes of WTP elicitation, such as postal, 398 
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internet, or even face to face (in-person) surveys may not be sufficient to derive useful WTP 399 
estimates for CWC management, since this is such an unfamiliar good (Czajkowski et al., 2015).  400 
Given this background, we chose a valuation workshop approach, which worked well in the sense 401 
that it gave us a robust dataset and significant attribute estimates. This said, it must be admitted that 402 
the costs of the survey were significant. Recent experiences have shown that an identical survey, but 403 
where all information was provided by the use of videos, can be implemented by the use of internet 404 
for only a fraction of the valuation workshop costs (Sandorf et al., 2014). The question is, however, 405 
whether such an internet survey could have been implemented without the experiences from the 406 
valuation workshops? As we see it, the benefits from implementing valuation workshops were not 407 
solely more robust and better informed WTP estimates, but also a learning process for SP-408 
practitioners when valuing unfamiliar (environmental) goods. Whereas focus groups provide 409 
information about how to present the good to be valued, and the pilot(s) control for how 410 
respondents manage to make “reasonable” choices, nowhere in the process of designing an SP-411 
survey do researchers have the opportunity to be informed about how people actually understand 412 
the questions they are asked to respond to.         413 
 414 
Valuation workshops do not come without drawbacks. Although the sample is relatively 415 
representative for the Norwegian adult population with regard to socioeconomics and geography, 416 
two issues may still make the sample un- representative of the general public. i) Prior to the choice 417 
experiment questions the participants were given information about CWC, and ii) the survey 418 
participants were allowed to ask questions regarding CWC and deliberate on the issues around 419 
protecting such sites. These issues obviously imply that the survey sample on average is more 420 
informed about CWC than the Norwegian public in general. This is important since results from the 421 
valuation literature show a positive correlation between the level of knowledge of a good and the 422 
WTP for the same good (Spash 2002, LaRiviere et al., 2014).  In addition we have the so-called “social 423 
desirability” effect, which states that people tend to increase their stated WTP for a good when given 424 
in a social setting compared to when they are surveyed in social isolation (List et al., 2004, Leggett et 425 
al., 2003).  426 
       427 
Based on the results from the survey reported above, the message to Norwegian coastal authorities 428 
is that people do care for CWC per se, and especially if it constitutes an important habitat for fish. 429 
Also, they are willing to accept that commercial fishing and the oil industry are adversely affected by 430 
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CWC protection. Norwegian coastal authorities and managers emphasize the importance of 431 
implementing policy, which to the extent possible, is accepted by those who are subject to these 432 
rules and regulations (pers. comm. Egil Lekven, Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries, 28.09.2012). 433 
Hence, the authorities are particularly sensitive to the feedback from fishers and other people 434 
working in the marine industries. Our results show that people working in the oil industry had a 435 
higher WTP for the habitat attribute compared to people working in other industries. In addition, 436 
54% of the respondents working in marine industries (fisheries, aquaculture and oil exploitation) 437 
state that industrial activities off shore must be executed with care in order to make as little damage 438 
to CWC as possible. The remaining 46% of respondents working in the marine sector state that we 439 
have to accept that some CWC may get lost due to industrial activities. The corresponding numbers 440 
for respondents not working in the marine industries are 68% and 32%. Hence, although respondents 441 
from marine industries are to a larger degree willing to accept that CWC are destroyed due to 442 
industrial activities, a majority still are of the opinion that such activity must be executed with 443 
outmost care in order to avoid damage to CWC. Such a result is of interest for the authorities, as it 444 
indicates that protecting areas with CWC from, first and foremost, bottom trawling may gain support 445 
from those who have to live with the consequences of the regulations. On the other hand, as only 8% 446 
of the respondents belong to the marine sector, and given the problems of self-selection and the 447 
knowledge bias, this result must be interpreted with care.  448 
 449 
5 Conclusions 450 
An increasing awareness that human welfare crucially depends on ecosystem services beyond our 451 
daily experiences renders information about these unfamiliar and inconspicuous goods and services 452 
highly important. The results presented in this paper show that further protection of CWC is 453 
regarded as a benefit for which people have a positive and significant WTP. In addition, although not 454 
yet rigorously scientifically proven, scientists suspect that CWC is important habitat for many 455 
commercially important species. These aspects make CWC important from a management 456 
perspective. The aim of this paper is to derive monetary estimates for people’s valuation of CWC, and 457 
to determine the motivations behind the derived WTP. The results revealed that people value CWC 458 
due to the fact that CWC provide habitat for fish (and other marine organisms), and for its pure 459 
existence. However, we were not able to disentangle the values people attach to CWC due to its role 460 
as habitat for fish compared to its pure existence.    461 
 462 
17 
 
There are challenges in valuing intangible, and for most people unheard of, organisms. In the worst 463 
case, we may end up with an invalid dataset, because the respondents have not understood what 464 
they were responding to. To avoid this pitfall, we implemented the survey as a type of valuation 465 
workshop instead of a traditional stated preferences survey. Whereas this rendered the survey highly 466 
valid, it came at the cost of possible sample bias due to self-selection and knowledge acquisition and 467 
the social desirability effect.  468 
 469 
This paper presents the first direct monetary valuation of CWC. Such a valuation of an intangible and 470 
relatively unknown good poses several methodological and practical challenges as described above. 471 
On the other hand, it has provided insights, which can be useful in the management of marine 472 
resources in Norway. First, we show that people in Norway derive welfare from knowing that CWC 473 
exists. Second, assuming that CWC plays a role as habitat for fish, we show that people motivation 474 
for protecting CWC is not only motivated by the fact that they consume fish, but also that they value 475 
fish having good and sufficient living conditions. Our results indicate that such considerations should 476 
be given significant weight in Norwegian resource management. Finally, our work illustrates the 477 
challenges inherent in the alignment of the MEA (2005) classification of ecosystem services with the 478 
older concept of Total Economic Value (TEV). 479 
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Appendix A 489 
 490 
Attribute  Alternative 1 Alternative 2 Alternative 3  
(SQ) 
Size of protected 
area (total) 
 
5.000 km
2
 10.000 km
2
 2.445 km
2
 
Attractiveness for 
commercial 
activities 
 
 
 
No, not 
attractive for 
any 
commercial 
activities 
Attractive for 
oil/gas and 
fisheries 
Somewhat  
attractive for 
oil/gas and 
fisheries 
Importance as 
habitat for fish 
 
Important Not important Some importance 
Costs per household 
per year 
 
100 kr/year 1000 kr/year 0 
I prefer     
 491 
Figure A1 Choice card used in the DCE 492 
  493 
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Appendix B 494 
 495 
Table A1 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 496 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ gender. ***, ** and 497 
* indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 498 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-1.5995 
(14.8912) 
73.0686*** 
(15.5776) 
202.4771*** 
(20.1415) 
Large-size 
40.8928*** 
(14.8719) 
99.5739*** 
(15.6675) 
233.0997*** 
(20.7660) 
Oil/gas 
23.3791** 
(9.8471) 
16.9129 
(9.3039) 
98.2431*** 
(8.3238) 
Fish 
13.3119 
(10.1590) 
11.8287 
(8.3010) 
105.7522*** 
(8.5319) 
Habitat 
175.3952*** 
(16.9902) 
159.5201*** 
(15.1114) 
216.9765*** 
(20.9028) 
Small-size*sex 
-21.7111 
(20.1577) 
-3.1876 
(26.8175) 
235.1352*** 
(30.7155) 
Large-size*sex 
-38.3644 
(20.4352) 
-24.4888 
(29.1217) 
239.5579*** 
(31.8762) 
Oil/gas*sex 
-21.3664 
(13.4468) 
-4.6147 
(13.3909) 
71.8871*** 
(12.7528) 
Fish*sex 
28.7139** 
(14.0689) 
32.2458** 
(12.9890) 
91.7690*** 
(15.4364) 
Habitat*sex 
-2.0932 
(14.9574) 
-6.2462 
(20.0993) 
173.1844*** 
(25.0731) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
77.1318*** 
(6.4918) 
72.7213*** 
(8.8205) 
110.6386*** 
(10.5950) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3436.4736, AIC/n = 1.5011, pseudo-R2 = 0.3232 499 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4753.2124, AIC/n = 2.0347, pseudo-R2 = 0.0639 500 
  501 
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Table A2 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 502 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ age. ***, ** and * 503 
indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  504 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-13.5260 
(10.7224) 
32.7543*** 
(7.9730) 
185.6130*** 
(15.2903) 
Large-size 
20.1445** 
(10.2080) 
62.7486*** 
(8.1677) 
241.9214*** 
(15.6967) 
Oil/gas 
12.1108 
(6.6846) 
22.8324*** 
(6.9099) 
80.5276*** 
(6.1978) 
Fish 
28.6054*** 
(7.2109) 
44.3110*** 
(6.7365) 
82.2134*** 
(6.5007) 
Habitat 
174.8088*** 
(15.1422) 
201.8291*** 
(11.1838) 
152.4431*** 
(9.5829) 
Small-size*age 
-13.4574 
(9.8426) 
-25.7249 
(16.6604) 
170.1484*** 
(16.0232) 
Large-size*age 
4.3242 
(10.1029) 
-19.7655 
(17.7201) 
186.2318*** 
(17.0909) 
Oil/gas*age 
-3.7183 
(6.7089) 
-7.8129 
(8.0972) 
61.6957*** 
(7.1841) 
Fish*age 
-23.3420*** 
(7.2299) 
-18.7839** 
(8.7613) 
65.8444*** 
(8.9848) 
Habitat*age 
1.2282 
(7.4303) 
-13.4736 
(11.8109) 
118.3180*** 
(12.1190) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
77.0820*** 
(6.5041) 
77.0260*** 
(9.6061) 
143.9347*** 
(11.9415) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3424.973, AIC/n = 1.4962, pseudo-R2 = 0.3255 505 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4747.098, AIC/n = 2.0321, pseudo-R2 = 0.0651 506 
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Table A3 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 508 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents being members of 509 
environmental non-government organizations. ***, ** and * indicate 510 
estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 511 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-20.1593 
(11.2388) 
32.7543*** 
(7.9730) 
185.6130*** 
(15.2903) 
Large-size 
12.6377 
(10.6727) 
62.7486*** 
(8.1677) 
241.9214*** 
(15.6967) 
Oil/gas 
8.5732 
(7.0188) 
22.8324*** 
(6.9099) 
80.5276*** 
(6.1978) 
Fish 
27.4969*** 
(7.5175) 
44.3110*** 
(6.7365) 
82.2134*** 
(6.5007) 
Habitat 
165.2576*** 
(14.6236) 
201.8291*** 
(11.1838) 
152.4431*** 
(9.5829) 
Small-size*age 
133.3908*** 
(41.2960) 
-25.7249 
(16.6604) 
170.1484*** 
(16.0232) 
Large-size*age 
140.4976*** 
(41.0388) 
-19.7655 
(17.7201) 
186.2318*** 
(17.0909) 
Oil/gas*age 
33.7738 
(22.0476) 
-7.8129 
(8.0972) 
61.6957*** 
(7.1841) 
Fish*age 
11.2708 
(22.9338) 
-18.7839** 
(8.7613) 
65.8444*** 
(8.9848) 
Habitat*age 
93.1677*** 
(26.8177) 
-13.4736 
(11.8109) 
118.3180*** 
(12.1190) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
77.3265*** 
(6.5145) 
77.0260*** 
(9.6061) 
143.9347*** 
(11.9415) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3424.973, AIC/n = 1.4962, pseudo-R2 = 0.3255 512 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4718.3075, AIC/n = 2.0198, pseudo-R2 = 0.0708  513 
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Table A4 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 514 
and MXL models including interactions with the number of adults in 515 
respondents’ household. ***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 516 
5% and 10% level, respectively. 517 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-11.8140 
(10.6661) 
25.7892*** 
(9.8439) 
200.4595*** 
(15.3289) 
Large-size 
21.6590** 
(10.1674) 
35.1875*** 
(9.8943) 
262.2640*** 
(15.8401) 
Oil/gas 
11.9676 
(6.6731) 
13.4038 
(7.3299) 
106.3659*** 
(7.2783) 
Fish 
28.5654*** 
(7.1847) 
21.0283*** 
(7.3327) 
97.6329*** 
(6.6465) 
Habitat 
173.9335*** 
(15.0483) 
163.3156*** 
(10.9335) 
154.2273*** 
(11.0068) 
Small-size*hha 
-25.3816** 
(10.7765) 
-4.9400 
(18.2107) 
122.4152*** 
(23.0915) 
Large-size*hha 
-32.7543*** 
(10.8326) 
-20.9364 
(20.0943) 
149.1938*** 
(24.8135) 
Oil/gas*hha 
0.7950 
(7.1545) 
3.5770 
(12.5101) 
59.7082*** 
(12.1311) 
Fish*hha 
-0.1698 
(7.4223) 
2.3496 
(10.3457) 
63.6251*** 
(11.9274) 
Habitat*hha 
-1.4092 
(8.0611) 
-11.7137 
(15.2722) 
132.9072*** 
(17.8534) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
77.0887*** 
(6.4900) 
82.7339*** 
(8.5124) 
111.8290*** 
(11.0080) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3442.8638, AIC/n = 1.5038, pseudo-R2 = 0.322 518 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4746.7894, AIC/n = 2.032, pseudo-R2 = 0.0652  519 
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Table A5 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 520 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ number of children 521 
in the household. ***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 522 
10% level, respectively. 523 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-13.3010 
(10.7211) 
53.1869*** 
(10.2026) 
164.2629*** 
(15.7049) 
Large-size 
20.4785** 
(10.1857) 
76.2262*** 
(10.0514) 
227.5745*** 
(16.2270) 
Oil/gas 
12.0069 
(6.6786) 
19.5160*** 
(6.5856) 
70.7980*** 
(7.1950) 
Fish 
28.7149*** 
(7.1968) 
27.3992*** 
(6.4849) 
93.9699*** 
(7.7029) 
Habitat 
174.3056*** 
(15.0928) 
151.9601*** 
(11.4279) 
180.9822*** 
(12.1278) 
Small-size*hhc 
-21.1655** 
(10.5523) 
-17.5428 
(15.1447) 
154.5121*** 
(16.5092) 
Large-size*hhc 
-15.6699 
(10.3815) 
-8.8567 
(16.2101) 
164.9145*** 
(16.8007) 
Oil/gas*hhc 
4.6687 
(6.8014) 
6.7790 
(9.2063) 
79.0411*** 
(8.7229) 
Fish*hhc 
7.1066 
(7.1383) 
7.1389 
(8.3740) 
66.4795*** 
(10.8303) 
Habitat*hhc 
5.4087 
(7.7207) 
13.8456 
(14.3369) 
120.4279*** 
(14.5313) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
76.9809*** 
(6.4867) 
90.1376*** 
(8.6879) 
128.1923*** 
(10.7849) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3436.0707, AIC/n = 1.5009, pseudo-R2 = 0.3233 524 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4757.3993, AIC/n = 2.0365, pseudo-R2 = 0.0631  525 
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Table A6 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 526 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ personal income 527 
level. ***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 528 
respectively. 529 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-10.8229 
(10.6811) 
55.8112*** 
(6.4389) 
179.8279*** 
(12.9113) 
Large-size 
22.4657** 
(10.1992) 
68.8861*** 
(6.2275) 
217.8179*** 
(13.5462) 
Oil/gas 
11.6468 
(6.6842) 
26.6931*** 
(5.1228) 
68.0622*** 
(6.3027) 
Fish 
28.1360*** 
(7.1917) 
42.0193*** 
(6.2412) 
94.7217*** 
(5.9729) 
Habitat 
174.3198*** 
(15.0923) 
173.6742*** 
(10.6594) 
170.3706*** 
(10.6996) 
Small-size*pincome 
23.7176** 
(10.3797) 
-6.4925 
(14.8224) 
87.6955*** 
(13.9267) 
Large-size*pincome 
32.6957*** 
(10.4923) 
-1.2910 
(14.2723) 
132.0466*** 
(10.9578) 
Oil/gas*pincome 
4.2861 
(6.5967) 
12.0139 
(7.8879) 
87.0703*** 
(7.6481) 
Fish*pincome 
13.3946 
(6.9835) 
22.4610*** 
(7.9653) 
67.3082*** 
(8.8072) 
Habitat*pincome 
4.5116 
(7.4466) 
20.3780 
(11.0017) 
94.8509*** 
(12.2034) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
77.0632*** 
(6.4886) 
90.6151*** 
(10.4568) 
157.6493*** 
(13.2144) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3434.8275, AIC/n = 1.5004, pseudo-R2 = 0.3235 530 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4736.1811, AIC/n = 2.0274, pseudo-R2 = 0.0673  531 
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Table A7 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 532 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ household income 533 
level. ***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 534 
respectively. 535 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-13.3661 
(10.7271) 
35.0046*** 
(8.7921) 
219.7241*** 
(17.0922) 
Large-size 
20.4588** 
(10.1862) 
51.5938*** 
(9.6956) 
290.3487*** 
(18.9990) 
Oil/gas 
11.9487 
(6.6821) 
10.6724 
(6.2237) 
92.8634*** 
(6.4229) 
Fish 
28.7103*** 
(7.1988) 
19.4476*** 
(7.2791) 
106.0714*** 
(7.4993) 
Habitat 
174.4173*** 
(15.1024) 
163.5352*** 
(10.3174) 
162.0451*** 
(10.3414) 
Small-size*hincome 
-21.5045** 
(10.0943) 
-64.8025*** 
(19.5461) 
136.2588*** 
(16.2863) 
Large-size*hincome 
-15.3735 
(10.0542) 
-69.4303*** 
(21.0146) 
153.1686*** 
(17.1366) 
Oil/gas*hincome 
0.0982 
(6.6196) 
3.6705 
(8.6577) 
51.3623*** 
(9.5468) 
Fish*hincome 
3.7842 
(6.8867) 
-0.3982 
(9.4339) 
65.2110*** 
(9.7769) 
Habitat*hincome 
9.3989 
(7.5010) 
24.3025 
(13.1462) 
99.8747*** 
(11.5908) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
76.9715*** 
(6.4854) 
98.3476*** 
(9.0473) 
129.4465*** 
(11.3568) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3424.7189, AIC/n = 1.4961, pseudo-R2 = 0.3255 536 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4757.0199, AIC/n = 2.0363, pseudo-R2 = 0.0632  537 
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Table A8 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 538 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ education levels. 539 
***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 540 
respectively.  541 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
-55.6833 
(38.5251) 
52.9145 
(115.0683) 
231.6006 
(143.3534) 
Large-size 
-66.3401 
(41.3738) 
30.6446 
(111.4714) 
204.2161** 
(99.6714) 
Oil/gas 
-19.9318 
(27.6183) 
1.0044 
(44.5224) 
129.3993** 
(53.1411) 
Fish 
55.0835 
(29.1112) 
35.9603 
(59.3785) 
214.1792** 
(105.0010) 
Habitat 
131.7686*** 
(31.8890) 
108.6970 
(90.5374) 
325.3339** 
(142.6970) 
Small-size*edu2 
37.0288 
(41.4678) 
6.9116 
(122.4868) 
262.7415*** 
(86.8379) 
Small-size*edu3 
16.7393 
(42.7366) 
-42.1792 
(143.9835) 
401.1912*** 
(120.8627) 
Small-size*edu4 
80.2271 
(42.2388) 
140.9109 
(129.7440) 
344.3777*** 
(90.2168) 
Large-size*edu2 
49.7075 
(44.2281) 
19.3465 
(122.3543) 
285.9476*** 
(78.0617) 
Large-size*edu3 
71.3299 
(45.3378) 
13.0773 
(132.5640) 
450.0153*** 
(118.3907) 
Large-size*edu4 
155.5929*** 
(45.6179) 
216.5508 
(127.4247) 
380.1734*** 
(98.6408) 
Oil/gas*edu2 
31.9527 
(29.8401) 
17.1055 
(50.8481) 
190.1547*** 
(46.1540) 
Oil/gas*edu3 
21.5652 
(30.7015) 
-12.8341 
(65.8962) 
308.1728*** 
(80.3226) 
Oil/gas*edu4 
44.7154 
(29.9018) 
8.6895 
(59.3535) 
313.6960*** 
(59.8571) 
Fish*edu2 
-8.4257 
(31.0900) 
11.8284 
(63.9837) 
275.6093*** 
(88.2622) 
Fish*edu3 
-27.8989 
(32.1424) 
-13.7492 
(87.4261) 
437.4155*** 
(103.7406) 
Fish*edu4 
-48.3876 
(31.2872) 
-45.1519 
(69.1979) 
318.6273*** 
(89.0861) 
Habitat*edu2 
60.3600 
(33.3612) 
83.4939 
(93.1402) 
400.8256*** 
(132.8616) 
Habitat*edu3 
41.1101 
(34.1317) 
138.3391 
(122.3494) 
620.5718*** 
(141.3993) 
Habitat*edu4 
30.1602 
(33.0277) 
108.0396 
(98.4263) 
451.9211*** 
(126.5175) 
Price (in preference 78.0016*** 108.1200*** 261.5705*** 
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space) (6.5179) (22.7911) (27.6411) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3292.3705, AIC/n = 1.5199, pseudo-R2 = 0.3516 542 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4725.1207, AIC/n = 2.027, pseudo-R2 = 0.0694 543 
  544 
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Table A9 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 545 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents living in coastal 546 
areas. ***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 547 
respectively. 548 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
6.2126 
(12.7402) 
74.4385*** 
(14.4840) 
238.1861*** 
(21.5538) 
Large-size 
41.5929*** 
(12.4917) 
75.5606*** 
(16.6944) 
324.8072*** 
(23.9982) 
Oil/gas 
19.6872** 
(8.3170) 
1.4302 
(8.6984) 
101.9891*** 
(8.0898) 
Fish 
27.0160*** 
(8.7904) 
30.2755*** 
(8.1645) 
90.3740*** 
(7.5614) 
Habitat 
157.6426*** 
(14.9098) 
145.5596*** 
(11.3516) 
138.2143*** 
(10.2727) 
Small-size*coast 
-52.7171** 
(21.1806) 
-54.7066 
(35.8184) 
213.6329*** 
(38.7826) 
Large-size*coast 
-57.2663*** 
(21.4707) 
-26.2789 
(37.7308) 
183.5715*** 
(36.4916) 
Oil/gas*coast 
-21.7808 
(14.0368) 
14.4083 
(18.0372) 
162.9807*** 
(21.1854) 
Fish*coast 
4.6669 
(14.4294) 
13.6939 
(21.3065) 
137.0991*** 
(17.6839) 
Habitat*coast 
45.4377*** 
(16.1126) 
97.4720*** 
(30.9601) 
229.7873*** 
(32.7702) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
77.2147*** 
(6.4935) 
67.5253*** 
(9.1344) 
116.1603*** 
(11.3757) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3433.7759, AIC/n = 1.4999, pseudo-R2 = 0.3238 549 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4749.9514, AIC/n = 2.0333, pseudo-R2 = 0.0645  550 
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Table A10 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 551 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents living in urban areas. 552 
***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 553 
respectively. 554 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
1.4810 
(11.9904) 
76.3176*** 
(10.4458) 
226.6086*** 
(17.1932) 
Large-size 
42.5906*** 
(11.6284) 
76.3361*** 
(11.5579) 
314.1618*** 
(18.8765) 
Oil/gas 
11.0700 
(7.6741) 
-11.8093 
(7.0352) 
109.4171*** 
(7.6410) 
Fish 
28.2822*** 
(8.1878) 
18.8630*** 
(6.6138) 
103.2025*** 
(6.4224) 
Habitat 
170.1934*** 
(15.2815) 
150.6411*** 
(9.7687) 
145.9575*** 
(10.1637) 
Small-size*urban 
-52.1100** 
(22.6521) 
-59.1299 
(40.4203) 
263.9154*** 
(57.7426) 
Large-size*urban 
-81.5140*** 
(23.8207) 
-53.9697 
(47.9150) 
250.3831*** 
(52.6989) 
Oil/gas*urban 
3.6153 
(15.2150) 
17.9266 
(20.9906) 
111.0886*** 
(26.7661) 
Fish*urban 
1.3837 
(15.7980) 
9.7533 
(27.2714) 
165.2332*** 
(29.7026) 
Habitat*urban 
12.5922 
(17.0277) 
43.6612 
(37.8565) 
181.9871*** 
(32.8401) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
77.4920*** 
(6.4826) 
84.5579*** 
(9.4224) 
123.8630*** 
(11.0872) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3427.2631, AIC/n = 1.4971, pseudo-R2 = 0.325 555 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4748.8291, AIC/n = 2.0328, pseudo-R2 = 0.0648 556 
  557 
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Table A11 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 558 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ work status. ***, ** 559 
and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 560 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
0.8243 
(53.8145) 
-4.4598 
(5.5013) 
99.4286*** 
(7.0368) 
Large-size 
-22.6067 
(55.3865) 
28.4999*** 
(6.0846) 
139.5364*** 
(7.4995) 
Oil/gas 
-9.3276 
(38.1438) 
13.8304*** 
(5.3624) 
103.5741*** 
(6.3692) 
Fish 
46.5242 
(39.1668) 
9.0967 
(4.9518) 
89.6548*** 
(5.4167) 
Habitat 
115.8885*** 
(42.3707) 
150.7982*** 
(8.7956) 
177.7242*** 
(9.7333) 
Small-size*work2 
-59.0539 
(77.7055) 
-42.3140 
(21.7354) 
91.1195*** 
(15.2229) 
Small-size*work3 
-63.7765 
(73.3517) 
-109.9586*** 
(23.7990) 
194.0534*** 
(29.9280) 
Small-size*work4 
30.0249 
(71.5272) 
26.7925 
(14.8291) 
78.0235*** 
(13.1569) 
Small-size*work5 
-40.4722 
(59.4563) 
-97.7921 
(199.0386) 
56.4045 
(155.3539) 
Small-size*work6 
-23.1881 
(57.0929) 
37.0603*** 
(11.1199) 
41.3516*** 
(6.5993) 
Small-size*work7 
3.2946 
(56.0285) 
-84.2646** 
(33.3054) 
130.0512*** 
(23.5257) 
Large-size*work2 
-99.1758 
(83.5497) 
-85.1258*** 
(15.6630) 
97.9256*** 
(10.4383) 
Large-size*work3 
-32.4732 
(74.7649) 
-72.2749*** 
(24.1403) 
103.0552*** 
(29.0060) 
Large-size*work4 
96.7611 
(71.6394) 
25.3062 
(15.3285) 
55.4858*** 
(9.1889) 
Large-size*work5 
43.5072 
(60.3195) 
-290.5297 
(172.6677) 
10.0404 
(112.2723) 
Large-size*work6 
49.2485 
(58.3403) 
-12.2220 
(10.2900) 
65.9354*** 
(10.1995) 
Large-size*work7 
51.6266 
(57.6741) 
-214.1708*** 
(40.8379) 
89.9138*** 
(32.8634) 
Oil/gas*work2 
28.8488 
(56.7293) 
-36.8899*** 
(14.2722) 
45.9670 
(25.6822) 
Oil/gas*work3 
9.1289 
(50.3809) 
-22.2731 
(22.4920) 
77.0666*** 
(24.5642) 
Oil/gas*work4 
-38.2853 
(48.2553) 
-22.5833 
(11.9559) 
47.9016*** 
(12.3098) 
Oil/gas*work5 
-2.5635 
(41.8109) 
-62.7264 
(121.2017) 
50.8726 
(92.4557) 
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Oil/gas*work6 
38.5565 
(40.1814) 
-14.4654 
(7.5714) 
88.3497*** 
(10.8367) 
Oil/gas*work7 
28.4994 
(39.6318) 
-80.1940** 
(35.9440) 
225.3366*** 
(51.0156) 
Fish*work2 
-50.2946 
(58.1704) 
-53.4141*** 
(12.5191) 
15.7781 
(29.0962) 
Fish*work3 
31.7633 
(53.0338) 
19.9546 
(16.1842) 
86.3783*** 
(11.2102) 
Fish*work4 
15.3837 
(49.5680) 
-40.5906*** 
(12.7157) 
13.5980 
(11.0613) 
Fish*work5 
-27.7626 
(42.9195) 
107.7791 
(154.8238) 
10.3423 
(130.2092) 
Fish*work6 
-23.8860 
(41.1161) 
39.8645*** 
(8.9579) 
82.0739*** 
(7.2864) 
Fish*work7 
-18.0226 
(40.5592) 
95.5073*** 
(26.4269) 
23.5889 
(25.0750) 
Habitat*work2 
145.4365** 
(65.7442) 
-15.0874 
(13.1524) 
99.3458*** 
(15.1267) 
Habitat*work3 
92.1813 
(56.6761) 
94.2700** 
(44.0982) 
197.3185*** 
(45.9819) 
Habitat*work4 
81.8422 
(53.9822) 
-45.9610*** 
(15.0920) 
3.9604 
(6.2831) 
Habitat*work5 
57.5358 
(46.0944) 
-160.0537 
(162.5293) 
9.9769 
(118.2894) 
Habitat*work6 
65.2822 
(44.2724) 
-43.7796*** 
(10.8374) 
95.7271*** 
(7.3684) 
Habitat*work7 
47.7620 
(43.4363) 
240.2054*** 
(46.9806) 
170.0890*** 
(32.4517) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
76.9657*** 
(6.5106) 
99.4778*** 
(9.4338) 
129.0380*** 
(9.8407) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3627.5998, AIC/n = 1.5805, pseudo-R2 = 0.2856 561 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4735.9952, AIC/n = 2.0381, pseudo-R2 = 0.0673  562 
32 
 
Table A12 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 563 
and MXL models including interactions with respondents’ occupation type. 564 
***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, 565 
respectively. 566 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size 
0.8243 
(53.8145) 
40.0654 
(28.9481) 
75.1364*** 
(7.4301) 
Large-size 
-22.6067 
(55.3865) 
-17.8618 
(37.7711) 
112.3242*** 
(7.3381) 
Oil/gas 
-9.3276 
(38.1438) 
1.8871 
(30.3730) 
64.8042*** 
(6.3397) 
Fish 
46.5242 
(39.1668) 
-3.7888 
(36.5764) 
83.4676*** 
(5.4995) 
Habitat 
115.8885*** 
(42.3707) 
63.2686 
(39.9699) 
143.6640*** 
(7.8136) 
Small-size*occ2 
-59.0539 
(77.7055) 
-62.8797 
(94.4512) 
150.5327 
(306.1169) 
Small-size*occ3 
-63.7765 
(73.3517) 
-73.0461 
(61.5627) 
48.6550 
(68.1144) 
Small-size*occ4 
30.0249 
(71.5272) 
-3.6943 
(54.0475) 
109.7413** 
(44.8146) 
Small-size*occ5 
-40.4722 
(59.4563) 
-81.9716** 
(33.1342) 
37.1030 
(20.0224) 
Small-size*occ6 
-23.1881 
(57.0929) 
-14.0227 
(30.6159) 
69.2227*** 
(9.7131) 
Small-size*occ7 
3.2946 
(56.0285) 
-13.0255 
(29.9436) 
59.5792*** 
(11.3611) 
Large-size*occ2 
-99.1758 
(83.5497) 
-18.6939 
(140.4622) 
99.7828 
(374.2790) 
Large-size*occ3 
-32.4732 
(74.7649) 
-11.9533 
(60.1130) 
108.4073 
(121.8136) 
Large-size*occ4 
96.7611 
(71.6394) 
51.9102 
(60.2978) 
114.1404** 
(47.3959) 
Large-size*occ5 
43.5072 
(60.3195) 
36.9308 
(43.4449) 
103.7293*** 
(23.6780) 
Large-size*occ6 
49.2485 
(58.3403) 
55.1878 
(39.1985) 
110.7137*** 
(13.9700) 
Large-size*occ7 
51.6266 
(57.6741) 
28.3444 
(37.9817) 
86.5913*** 
(10.6756) 
Oil/gas*occ2 
28.8488 
(56.7293) 
47.7096 
(249.9466) 
157.2712 
(147.0846) 
Oil/gas*occ3 
9.1289 
(50.3809) 
-68.3551 
(63.2195) 
147.1971 
(78.9228) 
Oil/gas*occ4 
-38.2853 
(48.2553) 
-46.6308 
(44.8319) 
4.6825 
(47.1852) 
Oil/gas*occ5 -2.5635 -22.2961 120.2258*** 
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(41.8109) (37.6613) (20.9903) 
Oil/gas*occ6 
38.5565 
(40.1814) 
10.0195 
(32.2823) 
112.9328*** 
(12.2452) 
Oil/gas*occ7 
28.4994 
(39.6318) 
-4.7238 
(31.5316) 
69.9387*** 
(7.9691) 
Fish*occ2 
-50.2946 
(58.1704) 
24.8506 
(86.4067) 
72.6734 
(48.7868) 
Fish*occ3 
31.7633 
(53.0338) 
77.3235 
(68.9325) 
90.7642 
(88.9028) 
Fish*occ4 
15.3837 
(49.5680) 
64.3431 
(56.8906) 
52.3107 
(51.8468) 
Fish*occ5 
-27.7626 
(42.9195) 
11.3251 
(39.3054) 
63.5381*** 
(17.5203) 
Fish*occ6 
-23.8860 
(41.1161) 
3.4640 
(37.8580) 
97.7757*** 
(17.9779) 
Fish*occ7 
-18.0226 
(40.5592) 
32.7861 
(37.3949) 
64.1400*** 
(8.7673) 
Habitat*occ2 
145.4365** 
(65.7442) 
158.6720 
(169.1785) 
132.1360 
(275.8064) 
Habitat*occ3 
92.1813 
(56.6761) 
160.5170** 
(62.8941) 
49.2630 
(52.9652) 
Habitat*occ4 
81.8422 
(53.9822) 
104.3213 
(62.8461) 
70.1460 
(122.1107) 
Habitat*occ5 
57.5358 
(46.0944) 
58.2237 
(45.3086) 
77.0704** 
(33.6302) 
Habitat*occ6 
65.2822 
(44.2724) 
96.2504** 
(42.0687) 
207.7326*** 
(20.5507) 
Habitat*occ7 
47.7620 
(43.4363) 
62.2234 
(40.7806) 
53.2077*** 
(9.6610) 
Price (in preference 
space) 
76.9657*** 
(6.5106) 
97.9444*** 
(8.9500) 
134.0622*** 
(11.9855) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3633.0413, AIC/n = 1.5828, pseudo-R2 = 0.2845 567 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4735.9952, AIC/n = 2.0381, pseudo-R2 = 0.0673 568 
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Table 1  Attributes and attribute levels 712 
Attribute Size of 
protected area  
(km
2
) 
Protected area 
attractive for oil/gas 
and fisheries 
activities? 
Protected 
area 
important as 
habitat for 
fish? 
Additional 
costs of 
protection 
Reference level 2.445 Partly Partly 0 
Level 1 5.000 Attractive for the 
fisheries 
Not 
Important 
100 
Level 2 10.000 Attractive for oil/gas 
activities 
Important 200 
Level 3  Attractive for both 
fisheries and oil/gas 
activities 
 500 
Level 4  Neither attractive for 
fisheries nor for 
oil/gas activities 
 1000 
 713 
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Table 2  Individual specific variables overview  715 
 Lowest value Highest value Mean  Number of 
observations 
Gender 0 (male) 1 (female) 0.465 394 
Age 18 years 88 years 46.6years 395 
ENGO 0 (not ENGO member) 1 (ENGO member) 0.1 394 
Education 1 (only obligatory) 4 (higher deg. Univ.) 2.84 394 
Labor force 
participation  
0 (not in labor force) 1 (in labor force) 0.63 393 
Working in the 
marine sector 
0 (other industries) 1 (the marine sector) 0.08 391 
Household size 
(cont. var.) 
1 8 2.5 397 
Personal income 1 (below 200K NOK) 10 (above 1 mill NOK) 3.5 388 
Household income 1 (below 200K NOK) 8 (above 1.5 mill NOK) 3.8 385 
Coastal areas 0 (interior areas) 1 (coastal areas) 0.63 397 
Urban areas 0 (rural areas) 1 (urban areas) 0.73 397 
 716 
  717 
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Table 3 Marginal willingness to pay (WTP) estimates in Euro resulting from the MNL 718 
and MXL models. ***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 719 
10% level, respectively. 720 
 MNL model MXL model 
Coefficient 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Std.dev. 
(s.e.) 
Small-size -13.3056 
(10.7111) 
53.0080*** 
(10.1943) 
227.0873*** 
(14.8310) 
Large-size 20.4293** 
(10.1842) 
66.5562*** 
(10.4839) 
286.4626*** 
(16.7408) 
Oil/gas 11.9665 
(6.6797) 
16.3399** 
(6.5881) 
100.2334*** 
(6.3774) 
Fish 28.6764*** 
(7.1949) 
39.0565*** 
(7.0045) 
107.5751*** 
(6.3688) 
Habitat 174.3036*** 
(15.0876) 
166.1023*** 
(10.1651) 
165.9122*** 
(9.4697) 
Price  
(in preference 
space) 
76.9370*** 
(6.4839) 
59.5790*** 
(7.0086) 
77.3143*** 
(8.4814) 
    
N 4683  4683 
MXL: LogLikelihood = -3483.1453, AIC/n = 1.4992, pseudo-R
2
 = 0.3140. 721 
MNL: LogLikelihood = -4759.7336, AIC/n = 2.0353, pseudo-R
2
 = 0.0626. 722 
 723 
 724 
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Table 4 Total WTP per household per year in EUR for small and large protection scenario.  726 
***, ** and * indicate estimates significant at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  727 
 MNL model MXL model 
 WTP 
(s.e.) 
95% c.i. 
Mean WTP 
(s.e.) 
95% c.i. 
Small protection scenario 201.58*** 
(15.05) 
172.09 - 231.08 
274.05*** 
(15.86) 
242.98 - 305.17 
Large protection scenario 235.28*** 
(16.55) 
202.83 - 267.73 
287.37*** 
(16.57) 
254.92 - 319.84 
 728 
